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- (3) Subsection (d)(1). Information within this record system could relate to official federal investigations and matters of law enforcement. Individual access to these records could compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants and/or sensitive investigative techniques used in particular investigations, or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation. Disclosure may also reveal information relating to actual or potential law enforcement investigations. Disclosure of classified national security information would cause damage to the national security of the United States.
- (4) Subsection (d)(2). Amendment of these records could interfere with ongoing criminal or civil law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.
- (5) Subsections (d)(3) and (4). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).
- (6) Subsection (e)(1). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory information contained in this system is accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement and counterintelligence, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.
- (7) Subsection (e)(2). To collect information from the subject individual could serve to notify the subject individual that he or she is the subject of a criminal investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to such investigations.
- (8) Subsection (e)(3). To inform individuals as required by this subsection could reveal the existence of a criminal investigation and compromise investigative efforts.
- (9) Subsection (e)(5). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory information contained in this system is accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement and counterintelligence, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing

patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.

- (10) Subsection $(e)(\theta)$. To serve notice could give persons sufficient warning to evade investigative efforts.
- (11) Subsection (g). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

[Order No. 645–76, 41 FR 12640, Mar. 26, 1976, as amended by Order No. 688–77, 42 FR 9999, Feb. 18, 1977; Order No. 899–80, 45 FR 43703, June 30, 1980; Order No. 6–86, 51 FR 15476, Apr. 24, 1986; Order No. 246–2001, 66 FR 54663, Oct. 30, 2001; Order No. 297–2002, 67 FR 70163, Nov. 21, 2002; Order No. 019–2005, 71 FR 17, Jan. 3, 2006]

§16.77 Exemption of U.S. Trustee Program System—limited access.

- (a) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a (c) (3) and (4); (d); (e) (1), (2) and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e) (5) and (8); (f) and (g):
- (1) U.S. Trustee Program Case Referral System, JUSTICE/UST-004.

These exemptions apply to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2).

- (b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:
- (1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting would permit the subject of an investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation. This would permit record subjects to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid inquiries or apprehension by law enforcement personnel.
- (2) From subsection (c)(4) since an exemption being claimed for subsection (d) makes this subsection inapplicable.
- (3) From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system might compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants, or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings

and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

- (4) From subsections (e)(1) and (e)(5) because in the course of law enforcement investigations, information may occasionally be obtained or introduced the accuracy of which is unclear or which is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interest of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity. Moreover, it would impede the specific investigative process if it were necessary to assure the relevance, accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of all information obtained.
- (5) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the investigation would be placed on notice as to the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.
- (6) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it would compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
- (7) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because this system of records is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k).
- (8) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirement of this subsection could present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that this could interfere with the U.S. Attorney's ability to issue subpoenas.
- (9) From subsections (f) and (g) because this system has been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d).

[Order No. 1-87, 52 FR 3631, Feb. 5, 1987]

§ 16.78 Exemption of the Special Counsel for Immigration-Related, Unfair Employment Practices Systems.

(a) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (d). (1) Central Index File and Associated

Records, JUSTICE/OSC-001.

These exemptions apply to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).

- (b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:
- (1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting would permit the subject of an investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation. This would permit record subjects to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid inquiries.
- (2) From subsection (d) because access to the records might compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants, or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation.

[Order No. 10–88, 53 FR 7735, Mar. 10, 1988]

§ 16.79 Exemption of Pardon Attorney System.

- (a) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a, subsections (c)(3), (c)(4), (d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4), and (e)(5): Executive Clemency Case Files/Executive Clemency Tracking System (JUSTICE/OPA-001). These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system of records is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
- (b) Exemption from the particular subsections is justified for the following reasons:
 - (1) From subsection (c)(3) because:
- (i) The purpose of the creation and maintenance of the Executive Clemency Case Files/Executive Clemency Tracking System (JUSTICE/OPA-001) to enable the Justice Department to prepare reports and recommendations to the President for his ultimate decisions on clemency matters, which are committed to exclusive discretion of